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Abstract Real-world color identification tasks often
require matching the color of objects between contexts and
after a temporal delay, thus placing demands on both per-
ceptual and memory processes. Although the mechanisms
of matching colors between different contexts have been
widely studied under the rubric of color constancy, little
research has investigated the role of long-term memory in
such tasks or how memory interacts with color constancy.
To investigate this relationship, observers made color
matches to real study objects that spanned color space, and
we independently manipulated the illumination impinging
on the objects, the surfaces in which objects were embed-
ded, and the delay between seeing the study object and
selecting its color match. Adding a 10-min delay increased
both the bias and variability of color matches compared
to a baseline condition. These memory errors were well
accounted for by modeling memory as a noisy but unbiased
version of perception constrained by the matching methods.
Surprisingly, we did not observe significant increases in
errors when illumination and surround changes were added
to the 10-minute delay, although the context changes alone
did elicit significant errors.
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Introduction
Recognizing and identifying objects in the real world
requires both perception and memory. Consider shopping
for an item, such as a scarf, to match an item already at
home, such as a pair of shoes (Fig. 1). Performing this task
requires the cooperation of several systems: the shoes must
be held in long-term memory, and then each potential scarf
must be perceived and held in working memory while a
judgment is made as to the best match. Upon reaching home,
we may discover that the selected scarf and shoes do not
match (Fig. 1, bottom right). Errors in such tasks are often
attributed to memory, but the perceptual and memory pro-
cesses involved in real-world tasks have rarely been studied
jointly.
To understand why perceptual processes might introduce
errors to real-world color memory tasks, consider again
Fig. 1. Items at the store are viewed under different illu-
mination and surrounded by different surfaces than they
are at home. Thus, the light that reaches the eye from the
scarf in the two locations is also different (two circles in
Fig. 1). Maintaining stability of color appearance across
such changes in the illumination and surrounding surfaces,
an ability known as color constancy, poses a challenge for
the perceptual system. Although failures of color constancy
are rarely salient features of visual experience, a large body
of empirical research demonstrates that color constancy is
imperfect (see Brainard and Radonjic (2014), Foster (2011),
Shevell and Kingdom (2008), and Smithson (2005), for
review). The pattern of errors made by observers is well
understood: observers typically fail to compensate entirely
for the physical change in chromaticity of the light reflected
by an object that is caused by a change in the illuminant.
Here we sought to address two questions: (1) How does
long-term memory affect the representation (both bias and
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Fig. 1 Illustration of a real-world color memory task. Shopping for a
scarf at the store (top left) to match shoes at home (bottom left) requires
matching a perceptual representation in one scene to a memory
representation in another scene. The light reaching the eye from an
object (two circles, top right) depends on the light source
variability) of color? (2) How does changing the context
between encoding and retrieval—that is, adding the percep-
tual demands associated with color constancy —affect that
long-term memory representation? To address these ques-
tions, we asked observers to identify the paint color of
real, three-dimensional study objects as we independently
manipulated the delay between seeing the study object and
identifying its paint color, the illumination under which the
matching paint color was identified and the color of the
surface surrounding the study object.
Predictions for long-term memory
Consistent with intuition, there is consensus that memory
introduces errors in color tasks, although there is consider-
able disagreement about the type and magnitude of errors
introduced by memory for color. This disagreement about
memory fidelity has arisen in part because memory for
color is studied in disparate fields. Researchers motivated
by understanding the structure of visual working memory
have used color as a convenient stimulus with which to elu-
cidate general principles of memory that are independent
of specific representational content. In contrast, researchers
motivated by understanding the representation of color
have used memory to make inferences about the repre-
sentation of color at different levels of the visual system
(cf. Allred & Flombaum, 2014; Brady et al., 2011; Olivers
& Schreij, 2014). Although elaborating on the differences in
approach is beyond the scope of this paper, we here outline
some main conclusions.
There is a general consensus that the variability of color
representation (1) increases over the few seconds of iconic
and working memory; and (2) reaches a plateau with no fur-
ther degradation in long-term memory. The first proposition
is a robust finding that generalizes across the variety of dif-
ferent methodologies employed by both working memory
research and color representation research (Bae, Olkkonen,
Allred, Wilson, & Flombaum, 2014; Brady et al., 2011;
Fougnie et al., 2012; Nemes et al., 2012; Olkkonen
& Alldred, 2014; Olkkonen et al., 2014; Uchikawa &
Ikeda, 1981). We note, however, that the exact form of the
decay and its dependence on memory load is highly con-
tested within the visual working memory community. That
variability increases is also consistent with work in other
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visual dimensions (cf. Magnussen & Greenlee, 1999). The
second proposition is more speculative, since relatively lit-
tle research has focused on the fidelity of color memory
through longer durations. However, Brady, Konkle, Gill,
Oliva, and Alvarez (2013) recently reported that although
objects were forgotten more frequently with long durations,
those that were remembered at all were remembered just as
precisely as those in working memory. We thus expect that
adding a delay between sample and match will increase the
variability of responses compared to a low-delay condition.
Although there is agreement that memory increases vari-
ability in the color representation, there is active debate
within the color representation community about whether
memory introduces systematic biases to the color repre-
sentation. (On this point, visual working memory research
is silent, since these paradigms typically have a built-in
assumption that memory is unbiased). Given the number
and contradictory nature of claims about color memory, it
is difficult to make one clear prediction about the effect
of memory on bias in color matches. For example, there
are claims that color memory is systematically biased
in the direction of greater saturation (Bartleson, 1960;
Burnham & Clark, 1955; de Fez et al., 2001; Siple &
Springer, 1983), or towards focal or prototypical colors
(Bartleson, 1960; Collins, 1932; de Fez et al., 2001).
Other work suggests that a number of performance ben-
efits accrue to focal colors in memory (Boynton, Fargo,
Olson, & Smallman, 1989; Heider, 1972; Uchikawa &
Shinoda, 1996). However, other studies have failed to
find any systematic biases in color memory (Hamwi &
Landis, 1955; Hedrich et al., 2009; Jin & Shevell, 1996;
Ling & Hurlbert, 2008; Nilsson & Nelson, 1981). In addi-
tion, most of this work focuses on working memory, and
little work has examined biases in long-term memory.
We note that a separate body of research has investigated
the distinct phenomenon of memory color (as opposed to
color memory). In memory color, the typical color of an
object (e.g., the yellow of a banana) influences either the
memory or perception of an object’s color (Duncker, 1939;
Hansen et al., 2006). Here we focus primarily on color
memory for objects without a typical color, and thus
focus exclusively on literature relevant to color memory, as
opposed to memory color.
Given the contradictory nature of claims about bias in
color memory, but the overwhelming evidence in support
of increased variability in memory, we developed an ideal
observer model that assumes memory is a noisy but unbi-
ased version of perception, and uses gamut characteristics to
constrain responses. Such constraints can in principle lead
to biases, if an observer’s desired response is outside the
palette gamut on some trials, but not on others. This can be
termed a simplest possible model for memory against which
other models could be compared.
Changing the context between encoding and retrieval
Given that the effect of illumination changes on color
perception is relatively well understood, there are three
possibilities for how changing the illumination will affect
color matches in memory. First, the sources of error in long-
term memory could be independent of errors introduced by
a change in the illumination. In that case, we would expect
the errors to add. Second, changes in illumination could
interfere with normal memory processes, causing errors that
are even worse than one would expect from independent
sources of error. Third, long-term memory and constancy
processes could share common sources of error. In its most
extreme instantiation, where all sources of error are com-
mon, adding a change in illumination would have no effect
on long-term memory matches.
Despite the ubiquity of everyday tasks involving both
memory and context changes, they are rarely studied
together. In reduced-cue contexts, there is some evidence
for the second alternative that memory interacts with con-
text changes to reduce overall constancy (Olkkonen &
Allred, 2014). Perhaps surprisingly, however, the limited
data available in realistic scenes are consistent with the
third hypothesis. Two studies that measured color constancy
with or without a delay concluded that memory did not
decrease color constancy (Jin & Shevell, 1996; Uchikawa
et al., 1998).
To summarize, we sought here to examine long-term
memory and its relationship to color constancy; that is, how
long-term memory for color relates to perception of color,
and how memory is affected by changes in context between
encoding and retrieval.
Materials and methods
Participants
Participants were 122 college students participating for
course credit, with normal color vision as assessed by the
Ishihara Color Plates. Procedures were approved by the
Rutgers University IRB (Protocol E10-410).
Apparatus and Stimuli
Observers viewed two adjacent 4′ × 4′ × 4′ grey flat
matte booths. Illumination in the room was provided sep-
arately for each booth (chromaticity in CIE Lu′v′ space;
Booth A: u′ = 0.274, v′ = 0.533; Booth B: u′ =
0.222, v′ = 0.503). There was no other source of illu-
mination in the room, and we verified that the booths
did not illuminate each other. Mounted 4.5 feet from the
front of each booth was a book of 1,022 paint chips
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(Sherwin-Williams, 2010) that served as a matching palette
(Fig. 3). Sixteen 3′′ × 3′′ × 3′′ cubes (subtending 4.5◦−6.5◦
at usual viewing distances), painted with different colors of
flat matte paint chosen to approximately span color space
(see Fig. 2) served as stimuli. In addition, eight painted
plywood shapes (see Fig. 3) served as backgrounds for
cubes on half of the trials. Cube, background, and palette
chromaticity measures were made using a Spectrascan PR-
655 spectroradiometer (Photo Research Inc, Chattsworth,
CA) and are reported in Allred and Olkkonen (2013). Lumi-
nance information was discarded. The illumination across
each booth was non-uniform, and in combination with the
three-dimensional nature of the stimuli, this meant that the
amount of light reflected by a surface depended on its loca-
tion within the booth. This can be seen clearly in Fig. 3,
where the top surface of each cube reflects more light to
the observer than either side. Radiometer measurements
verified that although luminance varied across cubes, chro-
maticity remained approximately constant. Each cube was
always presented in the same location within a booth.
Design
Participants made color matches to a total of 16 cubes
by manually searching through the palette and indicating
0.2 0.3 0.4
0.5
0.55
u’ 
v’
 
Fig. 2 Chromaticity in CIE u′v′ space of all 1,022 paint chips
(black dots), cube stimuli (colored squares), and booth illumination
(Booth A: black cross; Booth B: black plus symbol). Chromaticity
measures for all chips and stimuli are under (Booth A) illumination.
Chromaticity measures were taken with a PR-655 spectroradiometer,
and luminance information was discarded. Radiometer measurements
of each cube were taken on the top face of the cube, in the corner clos-
est to the observer, while the cube was in its experimental location.
Radiometer measurements of paint chips were taken in the center of
each chip, with the palette in its mounted location. Square color indi-
cates the cube’s apparent color. The black line surrounding the squares
is to increase figure visibility; no such border surrounded cubes in the
study. The relatively small range of v′ chromaticity results from the
narrow bands in the illuminants; paint chips and cubes spanned a large
reflectance range
the chip that best matched the cube’s paint. Participants
matched two cubes each in the eight different conditions
(see Table 1) resulting from a 2× 2× 2 factorial design with
background, illumination, and delay as factors. On each
of four trials, participants made four color matches (see
Table 2 for example). To do so, observers viewed four cubes
(see Fig. 3), two in each booth. One cube in each booth
was embedded in a background (left cubes each panel of
Fig. 3). Thus, both levels of the background factor (back-
ground/no background) were present on each trial. The four
trials varied the other factors as described in Table 2. In one
trial, observers simultaneously viewed cubes and matching
palette in the same booth (Fig. 3 top panel, baseline, and
background conditions). In a second trial, observers looked
back and forth between booths while viewing cubes in one
booth and matching palette in the other booth (Fig. 3, bot-
tom panel, illumination and illumination + background
conditions). A third trial was the same as the first, except
that participants had 1 min to memorize cube colors before
a 10-min delay during which the cubes were removed from
the booth and observers completed a survey or homework
to prevent them from rehearsing verbal labels for the colors.
Participants then returned to the room and made the color
match in the absence of the cubes (memory and memory
+ background conditions). A fourth trial added the 10-
min delay to the change in the illumination (illumination +
memory, and illumination + memory + background, condi-
tions). The conditions and trials are summarized in Table 1
and Table 2.
The data for baseline, illumination, background, and
illumination + background conditions were described else-
where (Allred & Olkkonen, 2013). The purpose of that
paper was to characterize color constancy of real, 3D objects
across changes in the background and changes in illumi-
nation. In that paper, we discuss motivations for choosing
particular stimuli, and the color-specific effects of different
backgrounds. Here we focus on the effect of memory itself
and how it interacts with constancy. Because of the com-
plexity involved, we felt the analysis and interpretation of
the constancy data itself was more appropriately addressed
in a distinct paper.
To prevent sequence effects, we used a between-
observers design. Thus, participants viewed each cube only
once, and performed one trial for each of the eight condi-
tions. Between-observers color matches for each cube were
made in all eight conditions. The order of the trials was
counterbalanced between observers.
Procedure
On each trial, observers entered the experimental room and
were seated in front of the two booths on a rolling chair. The
door to the room was closed, and the booth lights provided
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Trial 1
Trial 2
Fig. 3 Photograph of experimental setup for a two-example trials. On
each trial, observers viewed four cubes, two cubes each in (Booth A)
(left images) and (Booth B) (right images) that were separately illumi-
nated. On each trial, one cube in each booth was embedded in a 3D
background (for this condition, left cubes in each image). The match-
ing palette (booklet in the front of each booth) contained 1,022 paint
chips. The palette in each booth rotated freely on a long screw mounted
into palette, and the wooden stopper prevented observers from pulling
palette strips out of the booth. Observers were permitted to flip freely
through the book, but were instructed to choose a match only when
the palette strip was aligned with the stopper. On the trial labeled 1,
(baseline and background conditions) observers chose color matches
from the palette mounted in the same booth as the cubes. To illustrate
this, the palette is open to the green section (Trial 1, Booth A) and the
purple section (Trial 1, Booth B). On Trial 2 (illumination and illu-
mination+background conditions) observers chose color matches for a
cube from the palette mounted in the other booth. As illustrated, the
color match for the green cube (Booth A) was selected from the palette
in (Booth B), and the color match for the purple cube (Booth B) was
selected from the palette in (Booth A). On trials with a delay (not
shown), no cubes or backgrounds were present while observers chose
color matches
the only source of illumination. On each trial, observers
adapted to the room illumination while the experimenter
described the task. This typically took several minutes.
Observers were free to move about on the chair, but were
instructed to remain outside of the booths. To make a match
for a cube in each condition, observers searched through the
book of paint chips, chose the paint chip that best matched
the paint of the cube, and wrote the number of that paint chip
on a response sheet. To reduce illumination variation across
the samples, observers were instructed to make their choice
while the strip of paint chips was positioned against the
wooden stopper. No specific instructions were given about
what area of the cube should guide their choices.
On each trial, participants made matches from the palette
samples under each illuminant. Thus, it is unlikely that
observers were completely adapted to either illuminant.
Table 1 Description of the eight different conditions resulting from a 2× 2× 2 complete factorial design with background, illumination, and
delay as factors
Condition Background Cube / Palette Illumination Delay
Baseline None Same (A/A or B/B) None
Memory None Same (A/A or B/B) 10 minutes
Background Yes Same (A/A or B/B) None
Background + Memory Yes Same (A/A or B/B) 10 minutes
Illumination None Different (A/B or B/A) None
Illumination + Memory None Different (A/B or B/A) 10 minutes
Background + Illumination Yes Different (A/B or B/A) None
Background + Illumination + Memory Yes Different (A/B or B/A) 10 minutes
The first column is the condition name. The second, third, and fourth describe the level of the factors of background, illumination, and memory,
respectively. The illumination factor refers to whether observers chose the matching paint chip in the same booth as the cube (Same) or in the
booth other than the one in which they viewed the cube (Different). A or B designations refer to booth identity
Atten Percept Psychophys (2015) 77:1608–1624 1613
Table 2 Example trial order and conditions in each trial for one observer
Order 1 Booth A(1) Booth A(2) Booth B(1) Booth B(2)
Trial 1 Cube 1 2 3 4
Condition Baseline Background Baseline Background
Trial 2 Cube 5 6 7 8
Condition Memory Memory + Back Memory Memory + Back
Trial 3 Cube 9 10 11 12
Condition Illum Illum + Back Illum Illum + Back
Trial 4 Cube 13 14 15 16
Condition Mem + Illum Mem + Illum + Back Mem + Illum Mem + llum + Back
We counterbalanced to ensure that conditions were experienced in different orders, and this led to eight different orders of trials. The left column
indicates the trial number. For each trial, the top row indicates the cube number, and the second row indicates the condition for that cube. Columns
3–6 indicate the Booth (A or B) and the location within the booth (leftmost = 1, rightmost = 2) where the cube was presented). Across orders,
cube location remained the same
Data and analysis
We excluded seven of 122 observers for not recording a
response for at least 10/16 cubes or systematically record-
ing cube color in the incorrect location. From the remaining
1,840 trials (115 observers × 16 matches per observer), we
discarded trials for the following reasons: failure to record
a decipherable response (184/1,840, 10 %), errors in palette
chip chromaticity measures (32/1,840, about 2 %), and color
match of a clearly different, non-adjacent color category to
the cube (89/1,840, 5 %).
To calculate the average color match in each condition,
we discarded luminance information and computed arith-
metic means in both chromatic dimensions. We completed
analysis in both CIE u′ and v′, and CIE a∗b∗. CIE L∗a∗b∗
values were computed from XYZ tristimulus coordinates
using colorimetric routines in the Psychophysics toolbox,
and using the measured booth illuminant as the white point.
For each condition, variability was defined as the average
distance in CIE u′v′ (or a∗, b∗) space between each individ-
ual match and the average match for that condition. Because
the transformation between color spaces is non-linear, anal-
ysis of data in the two spaces gives slightly different results,
but the patterns are broadly similar. For the most part, we
report u′, v′ values; exceptions are for analyses involving
hue angle and saturation. The color space used in an analysis
is clear in the text and figure axes and captions.
We compared color matches between conditions using an
atheoretic bias calculation. In separate analyses, we defined
the correct color match in two ways: (1) Correct color
was defined as the cube’s measured chromaticity in the
booth where the match was made; or (2) Correct color was
defined as the average color match in the baseline condi-
tion. The motivation for using the average match in the
baseline condition as an operational definition of “correct”
is as follows: Here, we are primarily interested in how
experimental manipulations alter color matches. In an ideal
world, matches in the baseline condition would be iden-
tical to the physical chromaticity, and the two definitions
of correct would be identical. However, because the booths
themselves contained some variation in illumination, this
second definition allowed for the possibility of some non-
veridical matches in the baseline condition resulting from
luminance heterogeneities or because the surfaces surround-
ing each paint chip differ from the surfaces surrounding the
cube. Without this second definition, we could confound
illumination effects in the baseline condition with experi-
mental manipulations such as memory or context changes
between encoding and retrieval. Fortunately, the pattern
of results was very similar with both measures of correct
responses. Measures are clearly indicated in the text. In con-
ditions with an illumination shift, the correct chromaticity
was calculated by taking the chips chosen in the baseline
condition, but averaging their chromaticity measured under
the illumination shift.
For a more complete discussion of the apparatus and
methodology used in this experiment, including choice of
illumination, equations for analysis, stimulus characteriza-
tion, stimulus-specific background effects, matching palette
specification, and controls for the effect of palette non-
uniformity, see Allred and Olkkonen (2013).
All data analyses were performed using Matlab. Except
where noted, p values are uncorrected results from two-
tailed paired t tests. All conversions between color spaces
were made from the radiometer measurements using col-
orimetry routines in the PsychToolbox (Brainard, 1997).
Ideal observer model
To investigate possible sources of error in memory matches,
we developed an ideal observer model that operational-
ized the idea that memory is a more variable but unbiased
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version of perception. The model is not meant to implement
the neurophysiology of color perception or memory. Indeed,
the neural representation of color varies depending on brain
area and is not likely to match well to any particular rep-
resentation of color space (for discussion, see Gegenfurtner
(2003) and Hansen et al. (2007)). Instead, this model is
meant as a conceptual preliminary investigation of the
relationship between perception and memory.
First, we assumed that color is represented as a multi-
variate Gaussian distribution in CIE u′v′ space. Next, we
assumed that u′ and v′ are independent of each other, so
(u, v) can be characterized as u ∼ N(μu, σ 2u ) and v ∼
N(μv, σ
2
v ). We define μbaseline as the chromaticity of the
average match in the baseline condition. If the chromatic-
ity of the ith observer’s match is represented as (ui, vi),
then the average chromaticity for u and v are the respec-
tive means across the sets {u1, u2, ...un} and {v1, v2, ...vn}
in the baseline condition, where n is the total number of
observers. Similarly, σbaseline for u and v dimensions is cal-
culated as the standard deviation of the set {u1, u2, ...un}
and {v1, v2, ...vn} in the baseline condition, respectively.
Thus, for each cube we have μ(u, v) and σ(u, v) in the
baseline condition.
To model the effect of memory, we assumed that the
memory representation had the same mean chromaticity
as the baseline, so that μmemory = μbaseline. We modeled
memory of each cube as increasing the variability of the
baseline representation for that cube. Specifically, for each
cube, we assumed that in both u and v dimensions, the
standard deviation increased by a scalar factor k, such that
σmemory = k ∗ σbaseline.
To link the model to human performance, we ran 25-trial
simulations for each cube. The memory chromaticity on
each trial was a draw from the distributions defined above,
and the ideal observer chose the chip that minimized the
Euclidean distance between the chip and the chromaticity of
the draw on that trial. Average chromaticity for the 25 ideal
observer choices was calculated in the same way as for the
behavioral data.
Measuring prototypical hues
After observers completed the main experiment, we asked
them to flip through the paint palette and write down the
number of the paint chip that corresponded to the best exam-
ple of red, blue green, yellow, orange, pink, purple and
brown. Observers were randomly assigned to Booth A or
Booth B. We found no effect of booth on the chips cho-
sen for a given color name, and thus we collapsed across
booths. Hue angle for prototypical colors was determined
by using polar coordinates of CIE L∗a∗b∗ values con-
verted from CIE Lu′v′ space. The measured background
of the booth was used as the white point in the conversion
Table 3 Names (first column) and hue angle of baseline matches
(second column) for all 16 cubes in the order shown in Fig. 7
Cube name Cube hue Prototypical Prototypical hue
color category angle (average)
Light green 124◦ Green 144◦
Orange 62◦ Orange 59◦
Brown 62◦ Brown 57◦
Dark green 149◦ Green 144◦
Purple 318◦ Purple 313◦
Red 38◦ Red 37◦
Yellow 88◦ Yellow 86◦
Dark blue 242◦ Blue 247◦
Pink 20◦ Pink 14◦
Ice Blue 140◦ Green 144◦
Plum 24◦ Pink 14◦
Peach 55◦ Brown 57◦
Gold 76◦ Yellow 86◦
Aqua 205◦ Blue 247◦
Gray 80◦ Yellow 86◦
Doeskin 53◦ Brown 57◦
The prototypical color category (third column) and average hue angle
(fourth column) corresponding to each of the cubes are also shown.
For cubes above the horizontal space, the closest prototypical hue was
straightforward; for those following, each cube was assigned to the
nearest prototypical hue in terms of angular distance
calculations. For this calculation, saturation values were dis-
carded. Hue angles of prototypical colors are reported in
Table 3.
Results
There were two main goals of this paper: (1) Investigate the
role of memory in color matching tasks; (2) Measure the
impact of context changes on that role. To these ends, we
first compare errors elicited by memory demands to those in
the baseline condition and explore potential causes of mem-
ory errors. Next, we describe the pattern of errors elicited
when perceptual demands were added to memory demands.
Memory errors
All participants’ color matches for the dull green, orange
and brown cubes in the baseline and memory conditions
are shown in Fig. 4. In the baseline condition (unfilled blue
diamonds), participants chose many different paint chips.
This range of color matches in the baseline condition was a
common feature across all cubes (median number of paint
chips chosen in baseline condition = 7, min = 4, max
= 11; median number of observers per cube = 12; data
Atten Percept Psychophys (2015) 77:1608–1624 1615
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Fig. 4 Chromaticity of individual (open symbols) and average (filled
symbols) color matches for the dull green (a), orange (b), and brown
(c) cubes in the baseline (blue diamonds) and memory (green circles)
conditions. The open square in each plot is the average of the pro-
totypical color matches (see Methods) for that cube. The solid lines
represent the direction of increased saturation, which was defined in
CIE L∗a∗b∗ as increasing distance from the origin at the hue angle of
the average match. A point along this line was chosen, and these CIE
a∗b∗ coordinates were transformed into CIE u′v′. The size of individ-
ual data points is proportional to the number of observers choosing that
paint chip. In (a), (b), and (c), the x- and y-axis ranges are identical,
though the starting point shifts to accommodate the data
not shown). The baseline condition, where observers view
cubes and make matches simultaneously and under the same
illuminant, represents the best performance we could expect
to achieve in this task. Given this, the trend of variability in
baseline color matches is reassuring and provides a useful
sanity check: the paint palette was sufficiently discretized
to provide a reasonable estimate of between-observers vari-
ability in color perception. The region of space spanned by
color matches also varied by cube.
To understand how memory affected color matches, we
compared observers’ memory matches to baseline matches
in light of possible alternative outcomes (Fig. 4, green cir-
cles). In each panel, the solid line represents increasing
saturation: if memory were saturated compared to percep-
tion, then the average memory match (solid green symbol)
would fall somewhere along this line. In each panel, the
small square represents the focal color associated with the
cube: if memory were biased toward focal colors, then
the average memory match (green circle) should fall along
the dashed lines connecting the baseline match (solid blue
diamond) to the focal color (small empty square). If, on
the other hand, memory did not introduce bias but was
more variable, then the memory average (solid green circle)
would be very similar to the baseline average (solid blue
diamond), but individual memory matches (unfilled green
circles) would cover a larger region of color space than the
individual baseline matches (unfilled blue diamonds).
For these individual cubes, memory elicited a small
bias (Fig. 4), shown here as the distance in color space
between the chromaticity of the average memory match
and the chromaticity of the baseline match. Biases were
not consistently in the direction of greater saturation (solid
lines) nor toward focal colors (dashed lines). Unsurpris-
ingly, memory matches for these cubes did seem to be more
variable than baseline matches, as evidenced by the green
circles spanning a larger range of color space than the blue
diamonds.
The trends evident for the individual cubes continued
when data were aggregated across cubes (Fig. 5, left panel).
To gauge the size of the memory bias, we compared it to
the split-half baseline bias, calculated by randomly divid-
ing baseline color matches into two groups and calculating
the distance between the group averages (x-axis, Fig. 5, left
panel). On a cube-by-cube basis, the memory bias was on
average 1.96 times the baseline error (p < 0.05, two-tailed
paired t-test.) Unsurprisingly, memory matches were also
consistently more variable across cubes (Fig. 5, right panel,
p < 0.005). On a cube-by-cube basis, memory matches
were 1.57 times more variable than matches in the baseline
condition.
There is clearly a great deal of variability in the size of the
memory bias. Some cubes, such as red and purple, exhibit
large memory biases, while other cubes, such as gray and
doeskin, exhibit small biases. To gain more insight into the
relative sizes of these biases, we performed permutations
testing. To do so, we created a vector with all baseline and
memory matches. Next, we randomly assigned each match
to either the memory or baseline conditions, with the con-
straint of keeping the original number of trials per condition.
Next, we computed the bias between these two groups of
data, and we repeated this process 100 times. This provides
a sense of how often various biases could arise by chance
given the response palette. If the observed bias is larger
than most of these permuted biases, it suggests the bias we
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Fig. 5 Memory increases bias (a) and variability (b) of color
matches. a) Bias for each cube was calculated as the average of the
Euclidean distance between the (u′, v′) coordinates of the measured
cube chromaticity and the baseline matches (x-axis) and the mem-
ory matches (y-axis). b) Variability for each cube was calculated by
summing the distance between each color match and the average color
match in the baseline (x-axis) and memory (y-axis) conditions and
dividing by the total number of matches. In both a) and b) the solid
black line represents unity; each color represents the apparent color of
a different cube
observed is unlikely to have arisen by chance. Such per-
mutations testing is particularly useful in a data set such as
ours, where the underlying response space is known to vio-
late assumptions of normality. This should be viewed as a
conservative test. The results of the permutations tests are
plotted in Fig. 6. For 4/16 cubes, the measured bias was
larger than the permuted bias 95 of 100 times, which can be
thought of as significant at a p = 0.05 level.
Thus far we have established the size and significance
of the memory bias. Next we examine sources of errors in
memory.
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Fig. 6 Relative significance of the memory bias. The y-axis represents
the number of times that the observed memory bias was greater than
the permuted memory bias. Permuted bias was calculated as described
in the text. Bar color represents cube color. Horizontal red line is n =
95, reflecting a significance level of p = 0.05. The significance of the
permuted bias depends on the number of measurements, the size of
the observed bias, and the discretization of the matching palette at the
cube’s chromaticity
First, we evaluated whether memory matches are more
saturated or greater in chroma than baseline matches. It is
convenient to use CIE L∗a∗b∗ space for this analysis, since
the distance of a point (a1, b1) from the origin represents the
saturation of that point. To do so, we first converted aver-
age matches from CIE Lu′v′ space to CIE L∗a∗b∗ space
using the measured booth chromaticity as the white point
for the conversion (see Methods). In Fig. 7a, we plot the dif-
ference in saturation between memory matches and baseline
matches. If memory matches were more saturated than base-
line matches, we would expect each cube to be above the
zero line. Instead, on average, there was no significant dif-
ference between saturation of memory and baseline matches
(mean difference = 0.91;p = 0.65).
A second extant claim about color memory is that
observers are biased towards prototypical hues. To evalu-
ate this claim, we compared hue of memory matches to
both baseline hues and prototypical hues. Prototypical hues
for each observer were determined after the main experi-
ment, as described in Methods. In Fig. 7b, we plot the shift
in memory towards prototypical hue for each cube. Values
above zero indicate that memory matches were closer in hue
to the prototypical color than baseline matches were. For
each cube, the comparison prototypical hue was defined as
the hue angle closest to the baseline match (see Table 3). For
the nine cubes to the left of the vertical line in Fig. 7b, the
assignment of cube to prototypical color seemed natural. For
the rest of the cubes, the assignment seemed less natural; for
example, the cube we called aqua could be labeled as either
blue or green, and the cube we called gold does not seem
to be closely aligned with any of the prototypical colors. If
memory of a hue were systematically shifted toward the rel-
evant prototypical hue, the bars should be consistently above
zero in Fig. 7b. Instead, averages were close to zero both for
Atten Percept Psychophys (2015) 77:1608–1624 1617
0 10 20
0
0.01
0.02
Distance from prototypical hue
Er
ro
r 
−10
−5
0
5
10
Cubes
Sh
ift
 in
 s
at
ur
at
io
n
−20
−10
0
10
20
Cubes
Sh
ift
 to
w
ar
ds
 p
ro
to
ty
pi
ca
l h
ue
a b c
Fig. 7 Potential sources of memory bias. Bar/symbol colors represent
apparent cube colors. a) Difference between saturation of matches in
memory and baseline conditions for all cubes. For each cube, the aver-
age match in CIE Lu′v′ space was converted to CIE L∗a∗b∗ using the
chromaticity of the booth as the white point (see Methods). Lightness
information was discarded, and saturation for each point was defined
as its distance from the origin. Positive values indicate that memory
matches were more saturated than baseline matches. b) Angular shift
towards prototypical hue of memory matches compared to baseline
matches. Prototypical hues were determined for eight color categories
(blue, yellow, green, red, orange, brown, pink, purple) as described in
the Methods. Hue angle of color matches was determined by convert-
ing a∗b∗ values into polar coordinates. Y-axis values were determined
by subtracting the distance between memory matches and the near-
est prototypical hue from the distance between baseline matches and
the nearest prototypical hue. Positive values indicate that memory
matches were closer to prototypical hue than baseline matches. Cubes
were divided between those that were plausibly related to a proto-
typical hue (bars left of solid vertical line) and those that were not
(bars right of solid vertical line). See Table 3 for hue angle values
of cubes and prototypical colors. c) Relationship between memory
bias and distance from prototypical hue. X-axis represents angular dis-
tance of average baseline match from the nearest prototypical hue as
defined in (b). Y-axis is memory bias as reported in Fig. 5a. Solid
black line is the identity. Dashed black line is best fit line through
data
cubes to the left of the vertical line (mean = 2.10◦, p =
0.27) and for all cubes (mean = 2.06◦, p = 0.15).
Although we found no systematic bias of memory toward
prototypical hue, we note that many of the cube stimuli
were very similar in hue to the measured prototypical col-
ors. Furthermore, cube stimuli varied in saturation as well
as hue.
A third claim, related to the second, is that the fidelity
of memory for a color might depend on its distance from a
prototypical color. To evaluate this claim, we computed the
distance of each cube’s hue from the closest prototypical
hue, and compared that to the memory bias for that cube
(Fig. 7C). The slope of the best fit line is shown. A positive
slope would mean that cubes closer to a prototypical hue
were remembered more accurately; we found a small but
non-significant correlation (r = −0.22, p = 0.41).
The previous analyses showed no systematic relation-
ship between the fidelity of memory and the saturation or
hue of cubes. Next, we investigated whether the increased
variability of matches in memory (Fig. 5, right panel) com-
bined with the discretization of the palette could account
for the memory biases of the sort we observed in the data.
To motivate this idea, consider the red cube, for which
we measured a relatively large memory bias (Fig. 5, left
panel). The chromaticity of the red cube is near the right-
most edge of the palette gamut, as seen in Fig. 2, where color
space is relatively sparsely sampled by the paint chips. Sup-
pose that, instead of being biased, memory is simply more
variable than perception. The remembered chromaticity of
a given chip on individual trials will deviate from the aver-
age, and on trials where that deviation is to the right of the
red cube, no paint chips exist with a similar chromaticity. If,
on those trials, observers choose the paint sample closest to
the chromaticity in memory, their match will be shifted left-
ward from their actual memory. However, no such shift will
occur on trials where the deviation is to the left of the red
cube, because color space is more densely sampled there.
In principle, then, increasing the variability could shift the
average match for the red cube to the left, even if the mean
of the memory representation is the same as the perceptual
representation.
We developed an ideal observer model to operationalize
this idea, the details of which are described in the meth-
ods. Briefly, we assumed colors to be represented as noisy
multivariate Gaussian distributions.We further assumed that
the means of the memory and perceptual representations
are identical, but that the standard deviation of the distri-
bution in memory varies as a multiplicative factor k of the
perceptual distribution. On each simulated trial, the ideal
observer chooses the paint chip with the chromaticity clos-
est to the memory representation, which is a random draw
from the memory distribution. We then computed the size of
the simulated bias as the difference between the mean of the
simulated memory trials and the actual baseline match. This
procedure was repeated for 35 different values of k, result-
ing in simulated bias as a function of increasing variability
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Fig. 8 Ideal observer model. a) Relationship between variability
parameter k and memory bias predicted by the ideal observer model
(as described in Methods) for the four indicated cubes. Horizontal
dashed lines indicate the memory bias observed in the data. Lines are
best fits to model predictions for values of k that ranged from 0.5 to
3.5 in 0.1 increments. b) For k = 1.6, relationship between observed
memory bias (calculated as in Fig. 5a) and bias predicted by the ideal
observer model for all 16 cubes. Points are extracted from fits shown
in a). Black line is best fit through data. Note that x- and y-axis ranges
differ
for each cube. The simulated biases were well-fit by lines,
which we plot for four example cubes in Fig. 8a. For refer-
ence, the dashed lines represent the observed memory bias
for each cube. There are two salient features. First, simu-
lated bias increases as variability increases. If there were no
relationship between variability and bias, we would expect
the lines to be flat. Second, the slope of the lines is depen-
dent on cube. Variability affects bias for the red cube, which
is close to the edge of the palette gamut in Fig. 2, more than
it affects bias for the gray cube, which is close to the cen-
ter of the gamut in Fig. 2. For these cubes, the magnitude of
the simulated bias seems well correlated with the measured
bias.
In Fig. 8b, we plot simulated bias as a function of
observed bias for all 16 cubes, for one value of k, which
is the same as the average factor with which the stan-
dard deviation in memory increased compared to baseline
(k and observed increase = 1.6). Simulated bias values
were extracted from the lines fit in Fig. 8a. The correla-
tion between simulated and measured bias was significant
(r = 0.75; p < 0.001).
To summarize, an ideal observer model that character-
izes memory as a noisier but unbiased version of perception
results in a pattern of biases that is similar to that observed
in the data.
Adding context changes
Thus far, we have examined the effect of memory on
color matches. Next, we investigated the effect of adding
illumination and background to memory.
A change of context between encoding and retrieval
seemed to have little effect on either bias or variability
of color matches (Fig. 9). In Fig. 9, we plot the average
bias and variability in each condition employing mem-
ory, as well as the baseline condition for reference. If
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Fig. 9 Adding context changes has little effect on bias in mem-
ory matches. Bias (left bars) and variability (right bars) for memory
alone (green bars in each condition) and memory with the addi-
tion of context changes of illumination (yellow bars), background
(magenta bars), or illumination and background together (brown bars).
For reference, blue bars indicate error (left: split-half error; right:
variability) in the baseline condition. Error bars are s.e.m. across
cubes
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changing the illumination, embedding the object in a sur-
round, or doing both increased bias or variability, then the
green bars representing the memory error in Fig. 9 would
be lower than the others. Instead, they are approximately
the same height, with overlapping error bars. Paired two-
tailed t tests revealed no significant differences between
bias or variability in the memory condition compared to
memory along with any context change (i.e., illumination,
background, or illumination + background). For reference,
we also include the errors in the baseline condition (blue
bars).
One trivial explanation for such a null result is if changes
of context alone produced no errors in observers’ matches,
that is, if color constancy is perfect. However, as we pre-
viously reported when we analyzed the no-delay data sep-
arately, a change in the illumination without the 10 minute
delay did significantly increase bias and variability com-
pared to baseline (Figs. 6 and 7 of Allred and Olkkonen
(2013)). In fact, as calculated here, the illumination change
without the 10-min delay produced errors roughly compa-
rable in magnitude to the error elicited by the 10-min delay
alone (bias: illumination = 0.0075,memory = 0.0064;
variability: illumination = 0.011,memory = 0.010, data
not shown). Thus, the 10-min delay appears to interact with
the illumination change; errors in the delay + illumination
condition are smaller than would be expected if they added.
The additive prediction is shown in Fig. 9 as the solid black
bar, with the assumption that baseline error (blue bars) is
common to all predictions.
An additional indication that context changes without a
delay can elicit errors comes from permutations analysis
of the matches in the illumination condition and the back-
ground condition. As a reminder, the axis values represent
the number of times that the observed bias was greater
than the permuted bias; large values (i.e., > 90, here) rep-
resent biases that are significant at the p = 0.10 level.
We compared the relative significance of the observed bias
in the illumination (Fig. 10a) and background (Fig. 10b)
conditions to the relative size of the memory bias. Sim-
ilar numbers of cubes elicited significant biases in the
illumination (n = 7) and background (n = 8) conditions
as in the memory condition (n = 4). Interestingly, the
correlation between illumination and memory biases was
strong (r = 0.73, p < 0.005), whereas there was very
little relationship between background and memory biases
(r = −0.07, p = 0.79).
To summarize, adding context changes to a 10-min delay
does not significantly alter the bias or variability of color
matches.
Although adding context changes to the demands of
memory did not appreciably alter the bias of color matches,
we completed the same analysis about the source of errors
that we did for color matches in memory. We continued
to find no effect of memory on saturation of matches. A
four-way ANOVA with cube as a random effect, and mem-
ory, illumination and background as fixed effects showed
no main effect of memory (F(1,105) = 0.41; p = 0.52) on
saturation.
We also examined the shift toward prototypical hue from
baseline hue for all conditions. Again, a four-way ANOVA
showed no main effect of memory (F(1,105) = 0.39; p =
0.53) on hue shift.
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Fig. 10 Discriminability between baseline and experimental matches
determined with permutations testing. Axis values represent the num-
ber of permuted biases that were smaller than the observed bias in
the data. Larger axis values indicate that the color matches in the
labeled condition (memory, x-axis; illumination: y-axis in (a); back-
ground: y-axis in (b)) were more discriminable from color matches in
the baseline condition. Red horizontal lines indicate values of 90, so
data points above or to the right of this line indicate that color matches
in the two conditions were discriminable at the p = 0.10 level. Cir-
cle color is an approximation of cube’s apparent color. Black lines are
identity lines, and blue lines are best fit to data in a linear least squares
sense
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Similarly, we again found no significant correlations
between distance to prototypical hue and memory bias for
any condition involving memory (illumination + mem-
ory: r = 0.06, p = 0.81; background + memory: r =
−0.02, p = 0.94; background + illumination + memory:
r = 0.07;p = 0.78).
Next, we investigated whether the ideal observer model
outlined in Fig. 8a and b continued to explain the effect of
memory when perceptual demands were added. To do so,
we repeated the ideal observer process, but we substituted
the relevant perceptual demand for the baseline condition.
Thus, to predict performance in the memory + illumi-
nation condition, we assumed that μmemory + illumination =
μillumination. This allows for the likelihood that the illumi-
nation significantly shifts average color matches (as would
be expected from the incomplete color constancy). We
continued to model σ in each memory condition as a mul-
tiplicative factor of σ in the baseline condition, so that
σmemory + illumination = k∗σbaseline. In these calculations,
bias was calculated as the distance in color space between
matches in the baseline condition and matches in the rele-
vant experimental condition. As with the original model, we
then correlated the predicted and observed biases for each
cube as a function of k.
In Fig. 11, we plot the correlation between observed and
predicted bias when memory is added to baseline, (blue
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Fig. 11 Ideal observer predictions for the effect of adding a 10-min
delay to the other four conditions: baseline (blue line, reported in
Fig. 8), background (green), illumination (brown) and background +
illumination (yellow). Y-axis values are the correlation between the
observed bias in a condition and the bias predicted for that condition
by the ideal observer model, as described in the text. X-axis values
are variability parameter k as described in Fig. 8. Thicker lines indi-
cate correlations with significance p < 0.05. Vertical blue line is the
average k observed in the data for the memory-baseline comparison
line), background (green), illumination (brown) and illu-
mination + background (yellow), and heavy weight lines
indicate significant correlations. Although correlations were
highest for baseline, they were also significant when mem-
ory was added to the other conditions. Thus, modeling the
effect of memory as an unbiased but more variable version
of a perceptual representation continues to explain part of
the effect of memory.
Discussion
Here we measured the effect of memory on color matches
by adding a 10 minute delay between seeing a color stimulus
and selecting its match. We also examined how addition of
a context change affected memory matches. We found that
this delay elicited errors in average matches that are approx-
imately twice the size of errors in the baseline condition,
and that the variability among memory matches was also
elevated compared to baseline. The pattern of errors was
well accounted for by an ideal observer model that assumes
memory is a noisy, unbiased version of perception. Per-
haps surprisingly, we also found that changing the context
between encoding and retrieval did not add significant bias
or variability to the responses made in with a delay alone.
Below, we discuss both results in more detail.
Implications for color memory
Color matches made in memory exhibited significant biases
and were significantly more variable than those made in
the baseline condition (Fig. 5). Although the competing
claims about memory fidelity made it difficult to form a
clear hypothesis about memory bias, we evaluated the biases
we measured in light of three of these hypotheses. First,
we examined whether memory increased the saturation of
color matches (Bartleson, 1960; de Fez et al., 2001; Newhall
et al., 1957; Siple & Springer, 1983). Second, we tested
whether memory matches were biased toward prototypical
or focal hues (Bartleson, 1960; Collins, 1932). Third, we
examined whether the fidelity of memory for a color was
related to its proximity to a prototypical hue (Bartleson,
1960; Boynton et al., 1989; Uchikawa & Shinoda, 1996). In
no condition did we find evidence that memory had any of
these three effects (see Fig. 7 and reported ANOVA values).
The existence of biases related to color categories is
somewhat controversial (Ling & Hurlbert, 2008), and our
results are consistent with the notion that such biases are
not a salient feature of memory across a large range of
color space. It remains possible that these biases exist
only for a subset of color stimuli. For example, previously
reported category-related biases have been measured in
reduced-cue conditions such as color patches on a monitor
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(de Fez et al., 2001). The biases may be small enough that
they do not survive the further cues to surface reflectance
that arise in the complexity of real-world scenes. Alter-
natively, our study stimuli spanned a very large range
of color space, but it did not do so finely. Several of
our stimuli were very close in hue to prototypical colors:
our red cube was 1◦ different from our average mea-
sure of prototypical red and our yellow cube was 2◦ dif-
ferent than our average measure of prototypical yellow.
Perhaps stimuli with an 8◦ distance from a focal color
would have exhibited a focal color bias. We also note that
our measure of memory bias is relative to the baseline
of perceptual matches. Thus, it is insensitive to category
effects that arise in perception but are not exacerbated
in memory.
A much better account of the magnitude of memory
biases was found by modeling memory as a more vari-
able but unbiased version of perception. The model contains
two parts. The first contains an assumption about mem-
ory representation– that memory on each trial is a draw
from a noisy multivariate Gaussian distribution. The sec-
ond contains an assumption about the decision process, and
this rests on our particular choice of palette. In the model,
the ideal observer chooses the paint chip closest in chro-
maticity to the random draw. Thus, the discretization and
gamut of the palette are integral to the model. This simple
model was motivated by several empirical and theoretical
observations.
First, there are strong empirical grounds for the central
assumption of the model, that memory is more variable
than perception. We reported such increased variability
(Fig. 5). The factor of increase we observed (σmemory =
1.6σbaseline) is similar in magnitude to the increase in thresh-
olds found in other studies (1.5−2.5 in Nemes et al., (2010)
and 1.6 in Olkkonen and Allred (2014)), although the
two tasks and variability measures are quite different from
each other. That memory is more variable (less precise)
than perception is reported in traditional studies of color
memory (Nemes et al., 2010; Olkkonen & Allred, 2014;
Olkkonen et al., 2014), in studies of working memory using
color as the stimulus of interest (Bae et al., 2014; Brady
et al., 2013), and in other visual dimensions (Brady et
al., 2011; Magnussen & Greenlee, 1999).
Second, linking variability of color matches to the aver-
age bias of color matches is a key feature of this model.
This general idea of relating variability in a visual stim-
ulus dimension to the appearance of that stimulus dimen-
sion has received considerable attention recently in both
color (Hillis & Brainard, 2005; Olkkonen & Allred, 2014;
Olkkonen et al., 2014) and other stimulus dimensions
such as line length (Ashourian & Loewenstein, 2011;
Crawford et al., 2006), time perception (Jazayeri &
Shadlen, 2010) and speed perception (Stocker & Simon-
celli, 2006). In many such studies, biases are thought
to arise because a noisy sensory representation is com-
bined with prior beliefs about the stimulus collection. In
these cases, biases are often toward a particular stimu-
lus value, such as the average of the presented stimuli
(Crawford, Huttenlocher, & Hedges, 2006; Olkkonen &
Allred, 2014; Olkkonen et al., 2014). Here, we add to
this body of literature by showing that even without an
explicit prior, biases can arise through combining a variable
memory representation with characteristics of the matching
palette.
Given the ubiquity of evidence that memory representa-
tions are more variable than perceptual representations, and
the contradictory nature of claims about bias in memory,
the idea that increases in variability can masquerade as bias
seems important to evaluate. We combined this assumption
about memory representation with the specific features of
our matching palette. Although the particular discretization
or gamut of matching palette may vary widely from study
to study, the general goal of applying palette constraints
to understand the relationship between bias and variabil-
ity is likely to remain important. As one example, consider
that in most studies of color that span a hue circle, that
circle is chosen to maximize the saturation of the stim-
uli. Because of this, many stimuli are likely to fall near
the edge of the palette gamut, irrespective of whether that
palette consists of real objects (such asMunsell papers, NCS
papers, or OSA papers) or patches presented on a color
monitor. Indeed, Speigle and Brainard (1996) noted that on
light-emitting displays generally, many experimental stim-
uli fall near the edge of the monitor gamut. And any time
the representational variability of color overlaps the palette
gamut, color matches can exhibit biases, even if the palette
is nominally perceptually uniform. Thus, both parts of our
model are likely to generalize to other experimental designs,
although the particulars of the palette may differ from exper-
iment to experiment. The idea that increased variability in
memory can explain apparent biases is a simple one, and
we suggest that future studies should evaluate biases in light
of some implementation of this idea before invoking more
convoluted explanations.
It is conceptually simple to minimize the likelihood that
variability could masquerade as bias. To do so, the match-
ing palette should be uniform, finely sampled with respect
to memory variability, and the variability of memory repre-
sentation should not overlap the gamut of available matches.
Practically, however, various other experimental desiderata
conflict with this design concept. For example, to avoid
the edge of the gamut, study stimuli must be relatively
desaturated. In addition, many psychophysical techniques
vary stimuli in only one dimension (e.g., hue, saturation,
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or luminance). If the underlying memory representation
varies in more than the one dimension of possible matches,
similar distortions can occur. Thus, experimental design
may prohibit a choice of stimuli and palette that would pre-
vent variability from masquerading as bias. Fortunately, the
ideal observer model we have described here is relatively
simple to implement. Such implementation can provide a
reference for the size of bias expected if only variability
is increasing. Biases systematically different or systemati-
cally larger than these could then reasonably be attributed to
something other than increased variability.
Relating memory and context changes
In one canonical task used to measure color constancy,
a study stimulus is viewed under one illumination, and
observers adjust the chromaticity of a test stimulus viewed
under a second illumination until it appears to match the
color of the study stimulus. Observers typically adjust their
matches to compensate for the change in illuminant chro-
maticity. Matches may be made simultaneously or succes-
sively, with a brief delay between study and test. In realistic
scenes, color constancy indices are between 60 % and 90 %;
in other words, a change in illumination elicits a bias on
the order of 10–40 % (Shevell & Kingdom, 2008). In real
world tasks such as recalling an object at home to match
the color of an object at the store, color matches across
contexts are often made after much longer delays. Thus we
sought to examine the effect of changing context on memory
matches.
Adding a change in context to a 10-min delay did not
significantly alter color matches. If color constancy in our
experimental context were perfect, this would be a triv-
ial explanation: in other words, if a change in illumination
added no error without a 10-min delay, it might not be
expected to add error with a 10-min delay. However, we
previously reported that color constancy in this stimulus set
without a delay was 88 %, on average (Allred & Olkkonen
2013). This degree of constancy is within the range typ-
ically reported in color constancy studies with realistic
stimuli (Ba¨uml, 1994; Kraft & Brainard, 1999; Olkkonen
et al., 2010).
It is surprising that a change in context did not add a
significant degree of additional bias or variability to mem-
ory matches. To understand this result, consider that it is
likely that the processes of working memory are a com-
mon source of error in both the illumination condition
and the long-term memory condition. First, the illumina-
tion condition likely involved working memory. In our
task specifically, observers looked back and forth between
booths, and the time of a saccade is sufficient to demon-
strate effects of working memory (Nilsson & Nelson, 1981).
Empirically, the permutations analysis showed a strong
correlation between the discriminability of cube matches
from baseline in the illumination condition and the discrim-
inability of cubes in the memory condition, suggesting that
stimulus-specific effects share a common source of error. In
contrast, cube discriminability in the background condition
was not correlated with either the illumination or memory
condition.
More generally, we and others have noted that although
color constancy is often referred to as a purely percep-
tual phenomenon, it is both practically and theoretically
difficult to isolate the perceptual and memory contribu-
tions to matching surfaces between illuminants (Allen,
Beilock, & Shevell, 2012; Allred & Flombaum, 2014; Jin
& Shevell, 1996; Ling & Hurlbert, 2008; Olkkonen &
Allred, 2014). Thus, it should not be surprising that the illu-
mination and delay conditions likely share working memory
as a common source of error. This common source of error
may be responsible for the interaction observed in Fig. 9,
where the overall error is less than expected by adding
illumination error alone to the delay error alone.
Clearly, the effect of adding context changes to the delay
was less than the additivity prediction (Fig. 9), but it is diffi-
cult to draw a firm conclusion about whether adding context
to the delay had any noticeable effect. In aggregate, context
changes appear to add no additional bias. However, evaluat-
ing this claim statistically is difficult: rejecting the research
hypothesis that illumination adds significant bias does not
permit one to accept the null hypothesis that adding the illu-
mination had no effect on delay-only bias. Thus, the data
do not admit a firm conclusion. On the one hand, if the
null hypothesis were true, it might suggest that the common
source of error, working memory, is the only source of error
in the joint delay and illumination task. Consistent with this
view, increasing the delay past more than the few seconds
of working memory adds little error (Brady, Konkle, Gill,
Oliva, & Alvarez, 2013; Jin & Shevell, 1996; Nilsson &
Nelson, 1981; Nemes et al., 2010). Additionally, although
it seems counterintuitive, there is some evidence that color
constancy may improve with a delay. Jin and Shevell (1996)
reported that in some conditions, color constancy was higher
after a 10-min delay than a 10-s delay. If this is the case,
then the illumination-specific error present in the illumina-
tion only condition may become vanishingly small in the
joint condition that combines an illumination shift and long
term memory, leaving only the working memory error.
Still, a simpler alternative explanation for the failure
to measure significant additional error in the joint condi-
tion may be that the between-subjects variability was large
enough to mask a real effect, resulting in a Type 2 error.
Future research should examine further the interaction of
long-term memory and context changes.
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Conclusions
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that memory alone
elicits errors in color matches that are best accounted for
by a simple model that assumes memory is an unbiased by
noisy version of perception. We suggest that this null model
should be considered in explanations of color biases as a
comparison to more complicated theoretical frameworks.
Second, adding context changes to the 10-min delay does
not significantly alter color matches. These empirical obser-
vations lead us to propose that working memory is a source
of error common to both color constancy and long-term
memory. Further research should examine this proposition
more directly.
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